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INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the operation of ordinary percentagetype contingent fees in the settlement of litigation. Its object is
to identify the properties of the optimal contingent fee, from the
client's perspective, in a world in which cases settle. It addresses
the following problem: What contingent fee percentage maximizes the plaintiffs welfare, given that his lawyer can choose between going to trial and settling? How does it compare to the
fee that would be appropriate if the case were certain to go to
trial?
This is a crucial problem in a large number of cases, particularly in personal injury litigation. Most personal injury claims
are brought under a fee arrangement that apparently gives the
lawyer a simple percentage of the award; and the vast majority of
them are settled before trial, often very early in the litigation.
What characterizes the right percentage for the client to pay the
lawyer in such cases?
In exploring this matter, I build on a previous paper that
analyzed the optimal contingent fee in a world in which all cases
go to trial.' There I used a model in which the recovery on a
claim was a function of the effort exerted by the plaintiffs lawyer. In that model, the lawyer's percentage fee determines how
much effort she puts into litigating the claim. 2 The client's
problem boils down to one of encouraging the lawyer to exert
effort (thereby maximizing the value of the claim), without giving away too much of the recovery to the lawyer (thereby maximizing the client's distributive share of the claim).
Introducing the choice between trial and settlement is a
complex refinement of this principal-agent problem. The complexity arises from the fact that there are, in effect, two possible
routes to recovery with very different strategic configurations.
The client needs to worry, first, about which route the lawyer
chooses (settlement or trial), and second, about how vigorously
the lawyer pursues the claim along the chosen route. Finding
the fee that gives the lawyer the right incentives, without paying
1. See Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996).
2. Throughout this paper I refer to the client as he and the lawyer as she.
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her more than necessary, is accordingly harder than it was in the
earlier model, where it was assumed all cases go to trial.
I confine my attention to simple linear, or unitary, contingent fees, which give the lawyer a specified fraction of the recovery - e.g., thirty-three percent. As others have pointed out, this
is not necessarily the best type of fee arrangement for the client;3
for example, in some settings it may, in theory, be preferable for
the client to employ a more complex arrangement in which the
lawyer's percentage depends on whether the case settles or goes
to trial.4 But the pervasiveness of the simple linear fee amply
justifies investigating what the right percentage is, without asking
what better fee structures could be substituted for it. That is my
purpose here.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II gives an overview
of the problem and summarizes the main conclusions of the paper. Part III introduces a model of the "optimization" problem
facing the client, who wants to identify the fee that maximizes his
net recovery from his claim. Part IV discusses the conditions in
which the optimal fee in a world of settlement differs from the
optimal fee in a trial-only world; my object is to test the widespread belief that a fee should be lower if cases settle than if they
do not. Part V applies the argument of the earlier Parts to some
more precisely specified models of litigation and settlement.
3. Two main lines of argument in this regard may be distinguished. First, in some
settings, the client would do better, in theory, if the fee arrangement did not simply
consist of a percentage-of-the-award payment. This may be true, for example, of an
arrangement in which the lawyer both takes a fraction of the recovery andmakes a fixed
side payment to the client. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent
Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis, 24 RAND J. EcoN. 343 (1993) (describing how
the fee contract reflects the attorney's self evaluation of her ability and the client's
assessment of the case).
Second, even if the fee arrangement consists exclusively of a simple percentage-ofthe-award payment, the client may do better if the percentage paid depends on the
amount of work done by the lawyer. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in
Settlement, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 201 (1987) (describing contracts in which the lawyer's
percentage depends on the stage of litigation at which the suit is resolved).
4. I explore this point at length in a separate article. See Bruce L. Hay, Optimal
ContingentFees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997). That article focuses
on the structure of contingent fees; in particular, it examines the benefits of employing
a "bifurcated" fee (in which the lawyer gets one percentage if the case settles, and another percentage if the case goes to trial) in lieu of a "unitary" fee (in which the lawyer
gets the same percentage regardless of how the case is resolved). In contrast, the present Article assumes that a unitary, or linear, fee is employed, and it investigates the
problem of determining what percentage should be employed.
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OVERVIEW

The Settlement Problem

Consider the following hypothetical case: an accident victim
hires a lawyer to represent him in exchange for twenty-five percent of any recovery she obtains. If the case were to go to trial,
let us assume the lawyer would invest a total of 100 hours in the
case and produce an expected recovery of $120,000. We will assume this fee maximizes the client's net expected recovery from
trial. Instead of going to trial, however, the lawyer settles the
case early in the pretrial stages - when the lawyer has invested
only ten hours in the case - for a payment of $80,000. 5 Table 1
indicates the payoffs to the lawyer and client from this outcome.
TABLE 1
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: PAYOFFS FROM TRIAL AND SE71rLEMENT
Case Disposition
Trial
Settlement

Payment by
Defendant

Plaintiff's net
recovery

Lawyer's hourly
earnings

$120,000a
$ 80,000

$90,000a
$60,000

$ 300$2000

a Expressed in expected terms.

Viewed from the perspective of the client's welfare, there
are two troubling features about the outcome, as compared to
what would have happened had the case gone to trial. First, the
lawyer earns enormous profits from the settlement. 6 Had the
case gone to trial, her effective earnings, in expected terms,
would have been $300 per hour; in contrast, the settlement gives
her earnings of $2000 per hour. Thus, the client pays an effective hourly rate of seven times what he would have paid if the
case had gone to trial.
Second, the amount of the settlement is substantially less
than the expected amount the defendant would have paid had
the case gone to trial. As a result, the settlement leaves the client
in a worse position, at least strictly in monetary terms, than if the
5. We can assume that the client consents to the settlement.
6. Our assumption here is that the lawyer would have earned at least her opportunity cost if the case had gone to trial. The opportunity cost of an action is defined as
the value of the foregone alternative action. See THE DICrIONARY OF MODERN ECONOM-

ics 316 (David W. Pearce ed., 1981).
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case had gone to trial. 7 The one who benefits from the settlement is the lawyer, who saves virtually all the time and effort she
would otherwise have to spend on the case.8
Having seen this outcome, let us go back to the selection of
a fee. Ex ante,was twenty-five percent the right fee for the client?
At the most basic level, identifying the optimal fee requires attention to two matters: the fee's effect on the size of the expected
recovery on the claim, and its effect on the division of the proceeds between lawyer and client. My earlier study examined
these matters on the assumption that claims definitely went to
trial. Allowing for the possibility of settlement complicates the
picture in important ways.
1. Dividing the Pie
Consider first the division between lawyer and client of the
amount recovered from the defendant. In essence, settlement
may enable the lawyer to collect enormous amounts of money
from the client in exchange for doing almost no work on a case.
As the above example shows, a fee percentage that gives the lawyer a seemingly reasonable rate of return in the event of trial has
the effect of giving her an absurdly high rate of return if the case
instead settles.
The problem is particularly acute because in most cases, settlement is the rule, not the exception. In many instances, lawyers take cases knowing they will likely obtain a speedy
settlement. There is little chance of actually having to invest in a
costly trial and risk being paid nothing for the lawyer's efforts. It
is therefore not implausible to say, in the above example, that
signing on for a twenty-five percent fee may have given the lawyer a virtually risk-free expected rate of return of about 2000 per-

7. If the case goes to trial, the client gets a net expected recovery of
(.75)($120,000) = $90,000. From the settlement, he collects only (.75)($80,000) =
$60,000. Note that if the client is highly risk-averse or liquidity-constrained, he may be
better off with the settlement.
8. If the case goes to trial, the lawyer's net expected recovery is (.25) ($120,000) 100H, where H is the opportunity cost of an hour's time and effort. From the settlement, her net recovery is (.25) ($80,000) - IOH. The settlement gives her a higher yield
than going to trial, provided that H > 111.
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cent!9 Attorney windfalls of this sort have provoked extensive
criticism from observers of the legal system.1a
How then does this affect the choice of fees? We know by
assumption that a twenty-five percent fee would be optimal in
our imaginary case, provided that the case were going to trial."'
Should the client pay that percentage if an early, substantial settlement is virtually assured, and trial only a remote possibility? If
not, what percentage should he pay?
2.

The Size of the Pie

Now consider the fee's effect on the expected payment recovered from the defendant. The expected payment is given as
follows:
Expected judgment
x
Probability of trial

Expected settlement
x
Probability of settlement

In my earlier study, all the client had to worry about in this regard was the fee's effect on the expected recovery at trial. Here,
he needs to worry about two additional items: the fee's effect on
the expected amount paid in settlement, and its effect on the
relative probability of trial and settlement.
These effects can interact in complex ways. They can push
in different directions: a fee that increases the expected settlement amount may decrease the probability of settlement, and a
fee that decreases the expected settlement amount may increase
the probability of settlement. Indeed, in a world of settlement in sharp contrast to a trial-only world - raising the fee may in
some instances shrink the size of the pie.' 2 The client thus has
9. Her hourly return was $2000 in the hypothetical, which translates (if we assume
the opportunity cost of her time is $100) into a rate of return of 2000%.
10. It is not hard to find anecdotes recounting cases in which winning an early,
substantial settlement was virtually a sure thing, so that a contingent fee percentage in
the 30% range gave the plaintiffs lawyer a risk-free effective rate of thousands, or even
tens of thousands, of dollars per hour. See, e.g., LESTER BRRTCMAN ET AL., RETINKING
CONTINGENCY FEES 22 (1994).
11. A lesser fee would lead the lawyer to invest less in the case, thus reducing the
expected payment by the defendant. The client must balance this effect against the
benefit of getting a greater distributive share of the recovery. It is not difficult to show
that in many cases a fee of less than 25% is inferior, from the client's perspective, to
some fee above 25%. See Hay, supra note 1, at 506-08.
12. Suppose, for example, that (a) cases settle for less than the expected judgment,
and (b) raising the fee increases the likelihood of settlement. In such a setting it is easy
to construct an example in which raising the fee has the effect of shrinking the expected recovery from the defendant.
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to sort out the magnitude and direction of the different effects
of the fee on the expected recovery from the defendant. How
does the optimal fee in a world of settlement differ from the
optimal fee in a trial-only world?
B.

Summary Conclusions

Here, stated in an informal manner, are the central points
made by the analysis in this article.
1.

The Rough Equivalence of Trial and Settlement

First, assuming (as we do throughout the article) that fees
are unitary, 13 the prospect that a case will settle does not, in general, lower the optimal fee percentage for that case. The intuition here is simple: lowering the fee weakens the threat value of
trial, and thus lowers the settlement value of the case. As the fee
drops, so does the plaintiffs lawyer's incentive to invest in the
claim should it go to trial. As a result, the defendant has less to
lose from going to trial, and thus will pay less to settle the case.
The point can be seen most easily if we assume that all cases
simply settle - once the plaintiff has hired a lawyer - for an
amount equal to the expected judgment at trial. In this setting,
the prospect of settlement does not affect the client's optimization problem at all; his expected return from using a given fee is
the same whether the case settles or goes to trial. He then obviously should use the same fee he would in a trial-only world,
since settlements simply mirror that world. This conclusion runs
contrary to the common intuition that the fee should be smaller
when settlement is likely than when it is not. The basis for this
intuition is that settling is cheaper than going to trial; since a
high likelihood of settlement means the lawyer's expected costs
are low, the reasoning goes, she should collect a relatively low
fee. This view is incorrect. To put the point most starkly: Even if
settlement is a sure thing and costs the lawyer nothing, the client may
want to give the lawyer as high a fee percentage as he would give if trial
were unavoidable. The lawyer will, to be sure, collect enormous
rents from such an arrangement, but lowering her fee percentage will simply put the client in a worse position.
13. That is, the percentage paid is invariant with the mode by which the case is
resolved.
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In fact, this point does not require the assumption that cases
actually settle for their expected value at trial. The settlement
amount may be less than the expected judgment, or it may be
more; it makes no difference. It also makes no difference what
the probability of settlement is. What matters is how the settlement amount and probability of settlement vary with the expected judgment. The client should pay the same fee as he
would in a trial-only world, so long as the following conditions
hold: (i) the settlement amount stands in some linear relation to
the expected judgment, and (ii) the probability of settlement is
unaffected by the fee.
2.

Departures May Be in EitherDirection

If we relax either assumption, the result just described does
not hold; the client does not necessarily want to use the fee he
would in a trial-only world. However, the departure may be in
either direction: in some cases he will be better off with a higher
fee, and in others a lower fee, than he would want in a trial-only
world. We should not, in general, expect the departure to be
predominantly in one direction. Let me briefly discuss two of
the factors that may push the optimal fee in one or the other
direction.
(a) Toughness in Bargaining. Raising the fee means the
plaintiff's lawyer has less to lose, or more to gain, from going to
trial. As a result, raising the fee makes the plaintiffs lawyer a
"tougher" bargainer, willing to insist on a greater settlement
amount than she would otherwise.14
This may or may not make it worthwhile to pay the lawyer a
higher fee than she would get in the trial-only world. There is
no way to rule out either possibility a priori. On the one hand,
14. Using the numerical example discussed above, assume the expected judgment
is $120,000 and the lawyer's expected litigation cost (if the case goes to trial) is $10,000.
Then the lawyer's reservation price for settling - that is, the minimum settlement he
will accept - is given by $120,000 - ($10,000/r), where r is the lawyer's fee percentage.
Inspection of this figure shows that if r goes up while the other terms remain constant,
the lawyer's reservation price increases.
We would not, in general, expect the other terms (the costs and the expected
judgment) in the above expression to remain constant as r increases. However, it is
straightforward to show that the lawyer's reservation price will normally go up with the
fee, even if we allow, realistically, the costs and expected judgment to change with the
fee - so long as the lawyer can control her costs. The intuition here is that the lawyer
will only increase her cost, the investment, if the marginal return to the claim is sufficiently great to compensate for the added cost. I demonstrate this formally below.
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making the lawyer a tougher bargainer generally increases the
amount for which the case settles. All else equal, that means the
pie gets bigger; if the growth is sufficiently great, it may justify
shrinking the client's fractionalshare of the pie.
On the other hand, making the lawyer a tougher bargainer
may reduce the likelihood of settlement. That may be bad for
the client, if he expects to receive a lot in the event of settlement. Increasing the settlement amount (by raising the fee)
may not be worth the reduction in the chances of settlement.
Indeed, the client may be better off reducing the fee, making the
lawyer a less tough bargainer, so as to improve the odds that the
case will settle.
(b) Asymmetric Information. The existence of asymmetric information about the plaintiffs claim also may push the optimal
fee up or down relative to the trial-only world. Consider two
examples.
First, suppose the defendant cannot observe the plaintiffs
fee arrangement but is symmetrically informed about everything
else. 5 Then it may be in the plaintiff's interest to choose a relatively low fee, hoping to "bluff' the defendant into settling for
more than the fee justifies. For if the defendant cannot observe
the fee, then the amount he is willing to settle for may, within
some range, be independent of the fee: he will pay the same to
settle the case, whether the plaintiff is paying a high fee or a low
fee. If settlement is sufficiently likely, the client may as well
choose the low fee.
A logic of this sort may imply that the optimal fee is below
what would be optimal in a trial-only world. Essentially, the intuition is that because the amount of settlement (unlike the expected judgment) is invariant with the fee, the size of the pie 16 is
less sensitive to the fee than it is in the trial-only world. So, in
this setting, pie-slicing in effect assumes more importance than
pie-enlarging. 7
15. The fee arrangement normally would be protected from discovery. Nonetheless, though the defendant cannot observe the fee arrangement in a particular case, he
may be able to draw inferences about it - for example, from the plaintiff's lawyer's
behavior in the case, or from information about the lawyer's customary fee arrangements. The plaintiff also might simply disclose the arrangement voluntarily.
16. The size of the pie is given by the expected outcomes of settlement and trial,
weighted by their relative probability.
17. The issue is complicated because the defendant, knowing of the plaintiffs
temptation to bluff, will rationally offer less to settle the case. In equilibrium, we would
probably expect to find mixed strategies, as we explore below.
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Second, suppose the parties are asymmetrically informed
about the content of the available evidence in the case, but they
are symmetrically informed about everything else. Then it may
be in the plaintiffs interest to pay the lawyer a relatively high
fee, in order to encourage her to reduce the asymmetry by investing effort in pretrial discovery and other information-gathering procedures. For instance, if the plaintiff has a better-thanaverage claim but the defendant does not know this, then it may
be worthwhile encouraging the lawyer to invest a greater amount
of time and energy in assembling and presenting the defendant
with the evidence, in an attempt to induce the defendant to of18
fer more in settlement.
Considerations of this type may imply that the plaintiff
should pay more than he would in a trial-only world. The intuition is that the size of the pie in this setting is even more sensitive to the fee than it is in the trial-only world. This is because
raising the fee has a twofold effect: not only does it increase the
expected judgment, but it increases the fraction, or multiple, of
the expected judgment paid in settlement. The upshot is that
the settlement amount increases more quickly (as a function of
the fee) than does the expected judgment. As a result, it is
worth giving up a greater share of the pie, as compared to the
trial-only world, in order to enlarge it.
III.

ANALYrICAL FRAMEWORK

Our focus is on a hypothetical case in which the plaintiff
seeks money damages from the defendant. He hires the lawyer 19
18. Referring again to our hypothetical case, suppose the average claim of the sort
brought by the plaintiff is worth $80,000 at trial. The plaintiff in our example has a
better-than-average claim. But demonstrating this fact to the defendant may require a
substantial investment by the plaintiffs lawyer - compiling affidavits, organizing the
fruits of discovery, and so forth. Rather than make this investment, the plaintiff's lawyer
may find it more profitable simply to settle for the average figure of $80,000. The client
faces the problem of inducing the lawyer to invest in raising the settlement value of the
case.

As a second example, suppose the defendant is privately informed about the quality
of the evidence in the case. If the plaintiff and his attorney make no effort to examine
the evidence in his possession, the defendant will be tempted to offer less than the true
expected trial value of the claim, much as a poker player is tempted to bluff about the
strength of his hand. The plaintiff and his attorney may be able to prevent this bluff thereby raising the amount they get in settlement - by examining the evidence through
formal or informal discovery procedures.
19. Presumably the lawyer is hired after all efforts to make the defendant settle
without a lawyer have failed.
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under a fixed linear contingent fee.2" The lawyer then proceeds
with the case until it either settles or goes to trial. We will assume there is only one opportunity to settle before trial,
although we will not make any assumptions about at which stage
of the pretrial process that opportunity arises. 2 1 We will use the
following notation:
p = Probability (judged at the time the fee agreement is
entered into) that the case will settle (1 > p > 0);22

s = Amount of the expected settlement, conditional on the
case settling;
w = Amount of the expected judgment, conditional on its
going to trial.
We take the client's objective, in setting the fee, to be to
maximize his expected monetary payoff from the claim. 23 Define the following additional notation:
r

= Fraction of the recovery given to the lawyer under the
contingent fee arrangement (0 < r < 1);

The client's objective, therefore, is to choose r to maximize the
value of the expression
(1 - r)[ps + (1 - p)w].

(1)

Solving the client's problem requires identifying the fee's
potential effects on both terms in expression (1) - on the size of
the pie (the bracketed expression), as well as the client's distributive share (1 - r) of it.

20. The fee is assumed not to be subject to later renegotiation between lawyer and
client.
21. We can instead think of s and w as representing "early" and "late" settlements,
assuming that when settlement comes late cases settle for roughly their expected value
at trial (since parties are well informed by then and have sunk most of their costs). For
convenience, we will speak of the choice between settlement and tial, but it should be
understood that the model can also be thought of as referring to the choice between an
early and late settlement.
22. Each of the following terms is intended to be evaluated at the time the fee
arrangement is entered into. 'We exclude the case where p = 0, since that puts us back
in the trial-only world.
23. Thus, we assume risk-neutrality.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT MAY OR
MAY NOT REDUCE THE OPTIMAL FEE

A.

When Does Settlement Make a Difference?

In this section I attempt to establish, in general terms, the
conditions in which the optimal fee in a world of settlement differs from the optimal fee in a trial-only world. We will use the
following notation throughout the rest of the article:
= The optimal contingent fee if a case is certain to go to
trial, i.e., if settlement is not possible.
r** = The optimal contingent fee if the case may be
resolved by either trial or settlement.
r*

We want to see when r** in a given case differs from r*.
1.

The Rough Equivalence of Trial and Settlement

Let us begin by supposing that the attorney's fee does not
affect the probability of settlement, and also does not affect the
fraction (or multiple) of the expected judgment paid in settlement. Thus, let
q = Fraction of the expected judgment recovered in
settlement.

We assume that p and q are both independent of the fee. We
then arrive at the following result: the optimalfee for a case that will
settle is the same fee that would be optimal if the case were to go to trial.
Our first proposition, in other words, is that if p and q are independent of the fee, then r** = r*.
This proposition might be thought of as establishing the "irrelevance of settlement" in deriving the optimal percentage fee.
It does not matter whether settlement is very likely or very unlikely; it does not matter whether the expected settlement is a lot
more than the expected judgment, or a lot less. So long as the
fee has no effect on these factors, then the client's problem is no
different than it is in a trial-only world. The prospects for settlement do not change the solution.
Demonstrating this proposition is simple. Suppose we want
to compare r* to some other fee percentage f By definition,
(1

-

r*)w* >

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss1/7
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where w* represents the expected judgment if the lawyer works
under r*, and 171represents the expected judgment if the lawyer
works under f Expression (2) implies that
Kx (1-r*)w* > Kx (1- f) z,

(3)

where K is any positive constant. Since p and q are both
assumed
24
to be constants, in the above expression we can let
K = pq+ (1-p).

(4)

Plugging (4) into (3) and rearranging terms, we have
(1- r*)[pqw*+ (1 -p)w*]

>

(1- f)[pqo,+ (1 -p) zZ].

(5)

This establishes the proposition. Since r* outperforms any other
fee, it follows that r* = r**.
The intuition here is as follows. In absolute terms, the performance of r* - that is, the amount the client gets as a result of
using that fee - may differ in a trial-only world and a world in
which settlement is possible. But in relative terms, that fee's performance in comparison to the otherfee, f, remains the same in trial
or settlement, and this is true regardless of the value of p and q.
Two important corollaries of this result are worth emphasizing. First, we do not need to know the value of p and q in order to
derive the optimalfee. For example, the value of q may be less than
one; it may be greater than one; it may vary from case to case in
a random and unpredictable way. So too with p. All that matters
is whether the values of p and q are independent of the fee. So
long as that is the case, the client does not need to think about
the amount, or indeed, the likelihood, of settlement. He should
simply give the lawyer the same fee he would if the case were
going to trial.
Second, if we do not know how the fee affects the value of p and q,
then r* is presumptively the optimal fee. Thus, if we lack a
theory of settlement bargaining that suggests how the fee affects
the fraction of the expected judgment recovered in settlement,
the client should simply give the lawyer r*.

24. Since 0 < p S 1 and q > 0, the expression to follow is positive, except in the
trivial case where p = 1 and q = 0.
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When r** May Diverge from r*

The above result does not hold if the fee affects the
probability of settlement or the fraction of the expected judgment recovered in settlement. Instead, we have the following
second result: If thefee affects the value of p or q, then r** will not, in
general, be the same as r*. Rather, the value of r** may be greater
or smaller than r*, depending on how the fee affects the value of
p and q.25
In essence, there are two possible reasons these factors, p
and q, may combine to render r* non-optimal. First, moving to a
different fee may improve the quality of the settlement reached by increasing the fraction of the expected judgment paid in settlement.2 6 In particular, suppose that the fee affects the value of q.
Then, all else being equal, the client can improve his welfare by moving thefee away from r* in the direction that increasesq. Thus, all else
equal, if raising the fee to a point above r* would increase the
value of q, then the client wants to choose a fee higher than r*
If, instead, lowering the fee to a point below r* would increase
the value of q, then the client wants to choose a fee lower than
r*.
Second, moving to a different fee may change the relative likelihood of trial and settlement, increasingthe likelihood of the one in which
the client will do better. If the client expects to get more from settlement than from trial, he will, all else equal, want to move the
fee in the direction that increases the likelihood of settlement.
If, instead, he expects to get less from settlement than from trial,
he will want to move the fee in the other direction.
B.

The Fee's Effect on Settlement
1.

A Simple Model of Settlement

The foregoing analysis establishes that the optimal contingent fee will depend on how it affects (1) the likelihood of settlement, and (2) the fraction of the expected judgment the
defendant pays in settlement. (If the fee affects neither of these,
then the plaintiff should simply pay the lawyer r* the fee that
would be optimal if settlement were impossible.) We want to
know, therefore, how the fee affects these two factors. To ex25. This result is derived in the Appendix infra at page 73.
26. The client cannot improve the quality of the result at trial, since r* by assumption maximizes (1 - r)w.
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amine this issue, we employ a general model of settlement that
focuses on the fee's anticipated effect on the parties' bargaining
positions.2 7 The model is intended to be sufficiently general to
encompass a variety of assumptions concerning the details of settlement bargaining, such as the information the parties have and
the structure of bargaining.
Assume that settlement negotiations occur some time after
the fee arrangement is entered into. Define the following additional notation:
Vp = Plaintiffs expected reservation price for settling (the
minimum amount he will accept to settle);
V = Defendant's expected reservation price for settling
(the maximum amount he will pay to settle).
The likelihood of settlement depends in substantial measure on
the existence of a positive settlement range - that is, one in
which the defendant's reservation price exceeds the plaintiffs.
The expected difference between the parties' reservation prices
is given by
VD- VP.

(6)

All else equal, the greater the difference between VD and Vp, the
greater the likelihood that at the time of bargaining a positive
settlement range will exist.
We will not attempt to predict the actual likelihood of settlement, which depends on the joint probability that there is a positive settlement range and that the parties will be able to agree on
a division of the settlement surplus.28 We know, however, that a
precondition for settlement is the existence of a positive settlement range. Since the likelihood of satisfying that precondition
27. The model builds on the standard works in the economic literature on settlement. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (offering an
expectation model for pretrial bargaining behavior); John P. Gould, The Economics of
Legal Conflicts, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of
the Courts, 14J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure andJudicial Administration, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
28. Even if there is a positive settlement range, the parties may fail to settle if they
have incomplete information about each other's reservation price. See Bebchuk, supra
note 27.
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rises with the difference between VD and Vp, the larger (6) is, the
larger p is.
Now consider the amount recovered in settlement. Define the
following notation:
A = Expected fraction of the settlement surplus captured
by the defendant in the event the parties settle (0 _ A
- 1).
Using this notation, the expected settlement amount is given
29
by
VP + (1- A) D.
(A)

2.

(7)

The Fee's Effect on Parties' Settlement Positions

From expressions (6) and (7), we can see that evaluating the
fee's effect on settlement requires us to examine its effect on the
parties' settlement positions (V and VD).
(a) Plaintiff Side. The main complication in determining
the plaintiffs reservation price is the diverging interests of lawyer and client. The client's reservation price for settling is simply
the amount of the anticipated judgment; in contrast, the lawyer's
reservation price will be lower than that, since she bears all the
costs of litigation. Depending on the extent of the lawyer's effective control over settlement,3 0 the reservation price of the plaintiff's side may be at or well below the anticipated judgment.
We can capture the different possibilities as follows. For a
given fee r, let x denote the expected value of the lawyer's anticipated litigation costs. (These are expected values, and their realization may be different at the time settlement bargaining
occurs.) Then the lawyer's reservation price is given by w - (x/r);
in contrast, the client's reservation price is w - or would be, if he
29. Note that this expression has several possible interpretations. It may mean that
the parties actually divide the surplus, giving the defendant an average fraction A. Or it
may mean that they always settle at one party's reservation price (depending on who
makes the final settlement offer) and that A represents the probability the defendant
will be the one to make the final offer. It makes no difference which interpretation we
adopt. The only assumption we make concerning A is that its value is independent of
the fee.
30. This includes the lawyer's influence over the client's beliefs about what will
happen at trial.
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knew its value."1 We can, therefore, represent the expected reservation price on the plaintiff's side as32
V = w-e0 (-i

(8)

where 0 is an exogenous parameter specifying the relative control of the lawyer and client over the settlement decision."
Thus, for a given fee, the equilibrium value of Vp will generally
be less than the expected judgment w.
How does the value of V change with the fee? Suppose the
plaintiff is choosing between two arbitrary fees, which we will call
high and low. Choosing the high fee makes the lawyer work
harder in the event of trial, but only to the extent that the return
to the claim is greater than the cost of additional work. The
result is that choosing the higher fee raises the net value of the
claim at trial, given by w - x, and thus also raises the plaintiff
side's reservation price. Raising the fee, therefore, generally
raises the value of Vp. 4
(b) Defendant Side. The main complication in determining
the defendant's reservation price is that he may not have the
same information as the plaintiff and the plaintiffs lawyer concerning the strength of the plaintiffs claim. To capture this issue, let us use the term WD to represent the defendant's estimate
31. Suppose the case settles for some amount s. The client's expected recovery
from trial is (1 - r)w, while his recovery from settlement is (1 - r)s. Settlement makes
him better off than trial only if s > w. In contrast, the lawyer's expected recovery from
trial is r - x, while her recovery from settlement is rs. Thus, settlement makes her
better off than trial if s > (no - x)/r = w - (x/r). This difference in the two actors'
settlement positions was first analyzed in Miller, supra note 3, at 199-202.
32. More precisely, the plaintiff's reservation price is given by O(w - x/r)+(1 - O)w by
adding both the attorney's reservation price and the client's reservation price. Rearranging terms in this expression gives expression (8).
33. The interpretation of 0 is analogous to that of A. Loosely speaking, 0 = 1 indicates the lawyer has complete effective control; 0 = 0 indicates the client has complete
control, including knowing his lawyer's estimate of the expected judgment; intermediate values of 0 mean control is shared.
34. The magnitude of this effect depends on the lawyer's production function. It
depends on the extent to which additional work increases the expected judgment, and
it depends on the value of 0. If 0 equals zero, then the reservation price increases
dollar-for-dollar with the expected judgment; but that is not true if 0 is greater than
zero. Thus, it is hard to generalize about the relation between V and the fee, beyond
saying that the former rises with the latter in some fashion.
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of the expected judgment at trial." We can then state the defendant's expected reservation price for settling as
VD = wD + Y,

(9)

where y represents the expected value of the defendant's anticipated litigation costs.
How does the value of V change with the fee? Assume that
the plaintiff is choosing between two arbitrary fees. Choosing
the high fee normally will make the plaintiffs lawyer work
harder. Assuming the defendant knows of the plaintiffs
choice,3 6 either the defendant's expenditures (y) go up as he
tries to resist the claim, or the expected judgment (wD) goes up,
or both go up.3 7 We can, therefore, conjecture that if the parties
have symmetric information, then increasing the fee has the effect of increasing the defendant's reservation price. 8 The picture is murkier, however, if we drop the assumption of
symmetric information; then VD may rise or decline as the fee
goes up, depending on the assumptions we make about the
case.

39

35. More precisely, u represents the expected value, at the time the fee is entered
into, of the defendant's estimate of the expected judgment.
36. Note the defendant may in fact know something about the plaintiffs fee arrangement, even though he cannot directly observe it. The possibilities include voluntary disclosure of the information by the plaintiff. The lawyer may have an interest in
calling attention to the high fee she stands to collect in the event the case goes to trial.
The defendant might draw adverse inferences if the plaintiffs lawyer says nothing
about the fee.
37. In any event, for reasons of revealed preference, the sum cannot decrease. If
the defendant could reduce his sum, he would do so whether or not the plaintiff chose
the high fee. See generally 4 THE NEW PALGRAvE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 166-71
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). "Competitive rational consumers reveal their preferences through their market behavior .... Any bundle of commodities less costly than
his chosen bundle must be less appreciated by a rational consumer than his chosen
bundle." Id. at 170.
38. How much it does so depends on factors like the following: how the fee influences the plaintiff's lawyer's choice of effort level; how her effort affects the expected
judgment; and how her effort affects the defendant's investment in the litigation.
These matters obviously may vary greatly across cases.
39. Suppose, to begin with, that the defendant is uncertain about what the plaintiffs lawyer's fee arrangement. Then, all else being equal, the value of VD will be the
same whether the plaintiff uses a high fee or a low fee. In other words, choosing the
high fee will have no effect on raising the defendant's reservation price.
Suppose now that the parties are asymmetrically informed about the evidence that
will emerge at trial. Here the effects are ambiguous. Generally speaking, the worse the
evidence supporting the plaintiffs claim, the higher the fee should be if the case is
going to trial. See Hay, supra note 4, at 263-64 (documenting this proposition). This
yields a paradoxical effect: choosing the high fee may signal to the defendant that the
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(c) Implications. Two basic points follow from this analysis.
First, raising the fee above r* may either increase or decrease the
likelihood of settlement.4 ° Second, the fraction of the expected
judgment that the plaintiff gets in settlement may be greater or
less than one,4 1 and this fraction may go up or down as the fee
rises.42 Accordingly, there is no way of knowing whether, in general, raising the fee above r* makes the client better or worse off.
Under some circumstances, r** lies below r*, but under others,
r** may lie above r*.
Notice that this point holds regardless of the relative costs of
settling or going to trial. Nothing in the foregoing analysis has
required us to assume that going to trial is more expensive, or
cheaper, than settling the case. It may be, therefore, that r** lies
above r* even if settling is a lot cheaper than going to trial.
There is simply no way of knowing a priori,without specifying in
greater detail a model of litigation and settlement.
V.

OPTIMAL FEES IN DIFFERENT SETTLEMENT STORIES

To this point we have provided only a general framework for
assessing the relation between the optimal fee in a trial-only
world and the optimal fee in a world of settlement. That framework is intended to apply to a wide class of settlement models,
differing in their assumptions about information, bargaining, attorney-client control, and the like. In what follows, I try to make
the analysis more concrete by seeing what the optimal linear fee
looks like in more precisely specified settlement models.
To do this, I explore two basic "stories" of settlement, which
emphasize different elements of the settlement process that are
only implicit in the foregoing analysis. The first story emphaplaintiff has a weak case, so that the VD drops in response to the plaintiffs choice of a
higher fee.
On the other hand, choosing a high fee may increase the plaintiffs lawyer's incentive to gather and disclose to the defendant information concerning the strength of the
plaintiffs claim. (Such disclosure may be required by discovery rules, but the plaintiffs
lawyer can comply with these rules with varying degrees of conscientiousness and thoroughness.) Doing so might be important if the plaintiffs claim is stronger than average. To the extent the defendant's information about the case can be affected by the
plaintiffs lawyer's efforts, the effect of choosing the high fee may thus be to increase
the value of VD, even though the defendant knows nothing of the fee itself.
40. This follows from the fact that VD may, as we have seen, go up or down.
41. If 0 and A are large, the fraction is likely to be less than one. If 0 and A are
small, the fraction is likely to be greater than one.
42. This follows from the fact that increasing the fee may raise or lower the value of
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sizes the relative influence over bargaining enjoyed by the plaintiff, his lawyer, and the defendant. The second story emphasizes
the presence of informational asymmetries between the plaintiff
side and the defendant concerning the claim. I use some relatively simple models to get a sense of the direction, and to a
lesser extent the magnitude, that these factors have on the selection of the optimal fee, using r* as a baseline.
A.

A Benchmark Case

To set the baseline, we begin by deriving the optimal trial
fee for a simulated set of hypothetical cases. Consider the family
of cases in which the expected judgment in a case has the following structure:
w = a(1 - e-,x),

(10)

where
a = An exogenous parameter representing the maximum
potential amount, in expected terms, at stake in the
case (a > 0); and
= An exogenous parameter affecting the marginal
productivity of the lawyer's efforts ([3 > 0).
The values of a and [3 reflect, in effect, the intrinsic strength of
the plaintiffs claim. The greater their value, the greater the expected judgment resulting from a given level of lawyer effort."
Table 2" indicates the optimal fee in a trial-only world for cases
5
falling within a plausible range of values for a and [3.
As our sample case for the analysis to follow, I have arbitrarily chosen the case at the center of the table, the case in which
the value of a = 100,000, the value of [3 is .0001, and r* = 32%.
My reason for choosing this one is that its optimal trial fee is
roughly the value - one-third - commonly encountered in the
market for legal services. I do not claim that this fee is in fact the
optimal trial fee for any cases arising in the real world. My ob43. Their significance is explored at length in Hay, supra note 1.
44. Table 2 is reproduced from Hay, supra note 1, which offers a justification for
focusing on this range of values for a and P.
45. The optimal fee, derived in the Appendix at page 73, is given by

I
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TABLE 2

OPTIMAL TRIAL FEES GIVEN DIFFERENT VALUES OF a AND

a
.001
.0005
.0001
.00005

20,000

100,000

500,000

r* = 22%
32%
71%
-

r*= 10%
14%
32%
45%

r* = 4%
6%
14%
20%

.00001

-

45%

ject, rather, is to ask the following conditional question: assuming
this is the optimal trial fee, what is the optimal fee in a world of
settlement?
B.

BargainingStories

Our first set of settlement stories emphasizes the relative influence over bargaining enjoyed by the plaintiff, his lawyer, and
the defendant. These factors are captured by the terms A and 0
in expressions (7) and (8). We want to know, in essence, what
the optimal fee is for different values of these two terms. To
simplify the analysis, we will assume that the parties have symmetric information about the expected judgment at the time settlement bargaining occurs. We will also assume, for simplicity's
sake, that the parties have identical litigation costs. Table 3 gives
the optimal fee for different values of A and 0, given these assumptions.4 6 Let us consider the significance of each parameter
in turn.
1.

Lawyer Control of Plaintiffs BargainingPosition (0)

The 0 parameter refers, loosely speaking, to the extent to
which the lawyer gets to establish the bottom line, or reservation
price, for settling. As we have seen, the lawyer's reservation price
is w - x/r,4 7 while the client's is w. *" For any settlement offer in
between these two amounts, the client would want to refuse it,
believing a better result could be achieved at trial, while the lawyer would want to accept it, believing a worse result might be
46. For a derivation of the formula for the optimal fee, see the Appendix infra at
page 73.
47. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
48. Or the client's reservation price would be if the plaintiff were as well informed
as his lawyer. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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realized at trial. We can interpret 0 as the probability that the
lawyer's reservation price, rather than the client's, will be the operative one in settlement bargaining.4 9
TABLE 3
BARGAINING UNDER SYMMETRIC INFORMATION:
OPTIMAL FEES GIVEN DIFFERENT VALUES OF 0 AND A

0

.1

.5

.9

.1
.5
.9

r**=17%
18%
19%

r**=23%
26%
30%

r**=31%
40%
50%

Here we can imagine different plausible stories. In some
settings the client will have only a very rough idea of whether a
proposed settlement amount approximates the expected judgment,5 ° because a lawyer in such settings may be willing and easily able to convince the client to accept a settlement that is,
unbeknownst to the client, well below the expected judgment.5 1
In such settings we would expect the value of 0 to be relatively
high. On the other hand, if the client has independent sources
of information concerning the expected judgment, or if the lawyer is worried about possible adverse professional consequences
of "selling out" on the client, we might expect the plaintiff to
refuse any amount much below the expected judgment. In this
event, the value of 0 is relatively low.
As we see from Table 3, as the value of 0 rises, so does the
optimal fee r**. The intuition here is that higher values of 0
mean, in effect, that a claim has less intrinsic strength in settlement. For as the value of 0 rises, so (all else equal) does the
likelihood that the case will settle for less than the expected
judgment w. Thus, on an intuitive level, raising the value of 0
has roughly the same effect as lowering the value of a or [3. All
49. Alternatively, we can think of the plaintiff side's reservation price as falling at a
point in between that of the lawyer and that of the client; 0 then indicates the location
of that point. It makes no difference which interpretation we adopt.
50. One may consider a tort case involving complex issues of proof, or highly variable damage measures such as pain and suffering.
51. My assumption here is that the client has formal veto power over a proposed
settlement. A court would be unlikely to honor any attorney-client agreement that gave
the lawyer the power to settle over the client's objection.
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else equal, therefore, the more influence the lawyer has on the
settlement decision, the greater her fee should be.
2.

The Parties'Relative BargainingPower (A)

To settle, the parties must agree on an amount somewhere
between their reservation prices.5 2 Each would like the amount
to be as close as possible to the other's reservation price. The
amount they finally settle on depends on each party's ability to
make a credible "final offer" - to make a credible threat to go to
trial if his settlement terms are not met. Here, too, it is possible
to imagine several stories. The defendant, if it is an organization
(such as an insurance company) may have an interest in establishing a reputation for being a tough bargainer, so as to extract
settlement concessions in future cases. That interest lends credibility to its threat to walk away if its offer is refused. 53 The plaintiff, if he is an individual, frequently has no analogous reputation
concerns, since he does not expect to be embroiled in similar
litigation in the future. So, on this account, the defendant
would have the upper hand in bargaining.
But there are other possible accounts. In some settings, the
plaintiff's anger or desire for vindication may lend credibility to
his threat to go to trial unless the defendant makes large concessions in settlement. 54 If the plaintiff's lawyer has control of the
settlement decision, she may have her own concerns about her
reputation that favor going to trial unless the defendant makes
big settlement concessions. 55 These considerations might sometimes give the plaintiffs side the upper hand in bargaining.
The value of A reflects the relative weight of these different
factors. A high value of A means that, in expected terms, the
case settles at a point near the plaintiff side's reservation price,
or equivalently, that there is a high probability the case will settle
for exactly that reservation price. As Table 3 shows, high values
52. Settlement here may include the idea of submitting to some type of binding
arbitration.
53. This is another way of saying that the defendant has more on the line than w +
y; also on the line are expected payments in future cases. Strictly speaking, this means
the defendant's reservation price will be different from w + y. I ignore this complication here.
54. Here again, this is a way of saying the plaintiff has more on the line than (1 r) w. See supra note 53.
55. She may want the publicity of a big trial so as to attract business; alternatively,
she may want to establish herself as a tough bargainer, so as to extract good settlements
in the future.
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of A push up the value of r**. The intuition here is similar to
what we saw with 0; high values of A lower the intrinsic strength
of the case.
Examining 0 and A together, we see that a claim's strength is
at its greatest when 0 and A are both low, for this means both
that the plaintiffs reservation price is high and that the settlement amount is at the greatest possible distance above that
price.56 In these instances, as we see from Table 3, r** is at its
lowest. Conversely, a claim is at its weakest when 0 and A are
both high, for then the plaintiff s reservation price is low and the
case settles very close to that price. In these instances, r** is at its
highest. Observe, finally, that when 0 = 0 and A = 1, the case
settles for exactly the expected judgment; there, as we would expect, r** = r*.
C. Information Stories
Let us now examine the significance of informational asymmetries between the parties concerning the expected judgment.
To keep matters simple, we will put to one side the variations in
0 and A that we have been discussing to this point.
1.

Information Concerning the Fee

Begin by assuming that the defendant is unable to observe
the plaintiffs fee arrangement with his lawyer. The defendant
knows the lawyer is getting a fixed percentage but does not know
what that percentage is. In this setting, the plaintiff may find it
in his interest to give the lawyer a lower fee than he would
otherwise.
The essential insight here is simple. Consider r* and some
lower fee f Suppose the defendant cannot tell which fee the
plaintiff is using. Then the amount he will pay to settle the case
is independent of the fee the plaintiff chooses. The plaintiff will
be tempted to save money by choosing the low fee, since choosing the high one would not increase the settlement amount.
Choosing the low fee has a cost, though, since it means the
plaintiff will do worse at trial if the case fails to settle. The defendant, knowing of the plaintiffs incentive to choose the low
fee (though unable to observe the fee he has chosen), will be
56. Another way of saying this is that the plaintiff extracts from the defendant most
of the settlement surplus.
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tempted to call the plaintiffs "bluff' and take the case to trial.5 7
If the defendant does this, the plaintiff will be better off if she
had chosen r*.
Asymmetric information concerning the fee thus creates a
complex strategic decision for the plaintiff. In general, the
plaintiffs optimal strategy in this setting is to pursue what game
theorists call a "mixed strategy": he should, with some
probability less than one (but greater than zero), pay the lawyer fee
r*, and otherwise pay the lower fee f For example, he might flip
a coin to decide which fee to pay."8 The resulting derivation is
illustrated in the Appendix."
Table 4 uses an example employing the same sample case
used above.6" The table gives the plaintiffs optimal strategy for
three different values of j 61 Notice that if f is very low, the plaintiff will be reluctant to use it. The reason for this is that the
lower the value of f, the more likely the defendant is to make a
low settlement offer - so that the plaintiff's bluffing strategy in
effect backfires. Thus, even if the plaintiff could use a fee much
lower than r* without the defendant knowing it, he will be reluctant to do so in equilibrium. However, as Table 4 indicates, it
will be tempting to use fees a little bit lower than r* in a substantial number of cases.
2.

Information Concerning the Evidence

Now suppose the defendant is unable to observe the
strength or quality of the evidence, or other exogenous elements, supporting the plaintiffs claim. To examine this prob57. Alternatively, the defendant might offer a relatively small amount in settlement.
58. Another interpretation of a mixed strategy is that some plaintiffs pay r*, while
others pay the lower fee.
59. See infra p. 73. The intuition is this: It cannot be in the plaintiffs interest to pay
r* all the time, since if he did so defendants would make high settlement offers accordingly - in which case, the plaintiff would be better off switching to a lower fee. Nor,
however, can it be in the plaintiffs interest to pay the lower fee all the time, since if he
did so defendants would scale down their settlement offers accordingly - in which case
the plaintiff would be better off using r*
60. This example is derived from a bargaining game in which (i) settlement bargaining consists of a single, take-it-or-leave-it offer by the defendant; and (ii) the plaintiff side's reservation price for settling is equal to the expected judgment at trial. Thus,
A 1 and 0 = 0. We assume that a = 100,000, that 13= .0001, and that the defendant's
litigation costs are the same as the plaintiffs.
61. We assume, as in the model, that the plaintiff is only choosing between r* and
one other fee. Thus, the reader should assume that only one value of i is available to
the plaintiff.
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TABLE 4
PRIVATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE FEE
Value of r in
relation to r*

Probability the
plaintiff uses r*

Probability the
plaintiff uses F

.50
.75
.90

.50
.25
.10

r = .75r*
= .50r*
r= .25r*

lem, let us restore the assumption that the parties are
symmetrically informed about the plaintiffs fee arrangement.
Here, too, the plaintiff may find it in his interest to give the lawyer a lower fee than he would otherwise. He does this in the
hope of tricking the defendant into thinking the claim is
stronger than it is.
Two factors drive this result.6 2 First, the plaintiff's fee gives
the defendant a noisy signal about the strength of the evidence.
Second, the stronger the plaintiffs evidence (or other exogenous elements of his claim), then, all else equal, the lower the
fee should be in the event the case goes to trial. The upshot is
that lowering the fee may have the curious effect of raising the
amount the defendant offers to settle the case, by leading him to
believe the plaintiff has a very strong claim.
Table 5 gives an example using the same sample case used
above.6 3 Assume that the plaintiffs claim is, from the defendant's standpoint, indistinguishable from a claim with "twice as
much quality" - meaning with twice the value of either a or [.64
The table indicates the optimal strategy for the plaintiff given
the relative proportion of such high-quality cases in the overall
population of cases. As the table indicates, the plaintiff may rationally pursue a "mixed strategy," sometimes using a fee lower
than would be optimal if the case were certain to go to trial.
3.

Investing in Information

Asymmetric information concerning the evidence, then, exerts downward pressure on the optimal fee, encouraging plain62. The formula is derived in the Appendix infra at page 73.
63. The bargaining game is identical to the previous one. Thus, A = I and 0 = 0.
We assume again that a = 100,000, that 3 = .0001, and that the defendant's litigation
costs are the same as the plaintiffs.
64. The optimal trial fee for the plaintiff's claim is 32%; for the high-quality claim,
it is 22%.
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TABLE

5

PRIVATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVIDENCE:
OPTIMAL FEES GIVEN DIFFERENT CASE PARAMETERS
Proportion of
high-quality cases

Probability plaintiff
uses 32% fee (= r*)

Probability plaintiff
uses 22% fee

.75
.50
.25

.55
.85
.95

.45
.15
.05

Plaintiffs case: a = 100,000 3 = .0001 (r* = 32%)
High-quality case: a = 200,000 3 = .0001 (r* = 22%)

tiffs to choose lower fees than they would under symmetric
information. An important caveat here: We have assumed there
is no way for the plaintiff to reveal the quality of his evidence.
(The interpretation here might be that settlement bargaining
occurs before discovery.) The analysis changes if the plaintiff
can influence the amount of information the defendant has
about the claim.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiffs attorney can invest
effort in gathering and presenting the plaintiff's evidence to the
defendant before settlement bargaining occurs. Then a plaintiff
who has a high-quality case might want his lawyer to reveal this
fact to the defendant, so as to improve the defendant's settlement offer.65 For that reason, he may be willing to pay the
lawyer a fee greater than r*, if doing so is needed to give the
lawyer a sufficient incentive to undertake substantial pre-negotiation efforts in order to distinguish him from his low-quality-case
counterparts.
This problem - of encouraging the lawyer to invest in the
case prior to settlement negotiations and not just prior to trial may arise in a variety of ways in any litigation in which the parties
are asymmetrically informed about the case. 66 On the one hand,
65. In the simple model just explored, the plaintiff with a high-quality case did not
care about revealing this fact to the defendant; the reason for this is he could always do
at least as well at trial as in settlement. One can, however, easily imagine settings in
which the high-quality-case plaintiff could, if the fact were known to the defendant, do
better in settlement than at trial. The plaintiff thus would have an incentive to call the
defendant's attention to the quality of his case.
66. The problem is less likely to arise under conditions of symmetric information.
Generally speaking, any pre-settlement expenditure under such conditions is, from the
spending party's standpoint, a waste, because it burns up part of the settlement surplus
without generating an offsetting improvement in that party's expected settlement
recovery.
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as we have seen, the plaintiff may stand to gain from having the
lawyer invest in transmitting to the defendant some of the plaintiffs
private information about the case.6 7 On the other hand, the
plaintiff may also benefit from having the lawyer invest in acquiring some of the defendant's private information about the case. 68
Doing so may raise the plaintiffs reservation price for settling
(Vp), there again improving the quality of the settlement from
the plaintiff's standpoint.
To analyze this problem, I will not explicitly model the bargaining process between the parties. Doing so would complicate
the discussion without adding much insight.6 9 Instead, I will use
a model that simply treats the expected settlement amount as a
positive function of the lawyer's pre-negotiation effort, without
saying anything about the details of bargaining. This should suffice to give some sense about how the pre-negotiation investment issue affects the optimal fee problem.
Let us suppose that the amount of settlement is a function
of the lawyer's pre-negotiation investment, as follows:
s = yw(1 - e-&8 ),

(11)

where
z = The lawyer's pre-negotiation investment;
y = An exogenous parameter representing the maximum
potential multiple (in expected terms) of w recovered in
settlement (y > 0); and
8 = An exogenous parameter affecting the marginal
productivity of the lawyer's pre-negotiation efforts (8 >
0).
67. For example, the plaintiffs lawyer has to decide how much to invest in documenting the strength of the plaintiffs case (for example, obtaining expert opinions
concerning the severity of the plaintiffs injuries) and how much to invest in furnishing
information to the defendant (for example, giving the defendant expert affidavits).
Discovery rules and the like leave the attorney with considerable discretion on these
matters.
68. Investigation, aggressive discovery, and poring over materials produced in discovery can yield such information about the defendant's case. Note that the defendant
has an incentive to disclose private information voluntarily if the information is unfavorable to the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff's lawyer may then have to decide how
much to invest in verifying the information.
69. See generally Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation,
20 RAND J. ECON. 183 (1989) (providing a model of voluntary information transmission in settlement bargaining).
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In this expression, z, y, and 8 play a role analogous to that of x, a,
and 3 in the trial production function in our sample family of
cases. The term yw indicates the upper limit of possible settlement amounts, in expected terms. When yw is less than one, the
upper limit is less than the expected judgment; when yw is
greater than one, the upper limit is less than the expected
judgment.
TABLE

6

INVESTING IN SETTLEMENT:

OPTIMAL FEES GIVEN DIFFERENT VALUES OF

y

.0002 (2p)

0.8

- 43%

1.0
1.2

39%
35%

y

AND

8
.001 (10)
-

37%

33%
30%

Let us see what the optimal fee looks like if we take w from
our sample family of cases. 7 ' Table 6 generates the value of r**
in the same case we examined in previous subsections. 7 1 Observe that r** may exceed r*
VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The principal conclusion emerging from our analysis is that
the possibility of settlement does not, in general, mean a lower
linear fee is preferable for the client to the fee that would be
optimal if the case were certain to go to trial. Why is this true?
Stepping back a bit from the model, the main reasons are these.
First, the moral hazard problems associated with trial carry over to
the settlement context. That is, giving the attorney a low fee means
she will put relatively little work in to the claim should it go to
trial, so the expected judgment will be relatively small. As a result, all else being equal, the defendant will pay relatively little to
settle the case. In this way, in a world of settlement the client
suffers all the agency-cost difficulties he would encounter if the
70.

The formula for the optimal fee in this Table is derived in the Appendix infra

at page 73.
71. Table 6 assumes that w, the expected judgment, is independent of the lawyer's
pre-negotiationinvestment, and it assumes that the case definitely settles.
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case were to go to trial. This is why r* is presumptively the right
linear fee, regardless of the likelihood of settlement.
Second, the possibility of settlement introduces its own additional
moral hazard problems. These arise, as we have seen, in both the
lawyer's decision to invest before negotiation and in the bargaining stage itself. In effect, they are cumulative with the moral hazard problems associated with trial. Thus, returning to the
analysis of Part IV, attorney moral hazard in connection with
trial accounts for the value of w; attorney moral hazard in settlement may account for the fraction q that the defendant pays of w
in settlement. It is this sort of accumulation of moral hazard
72
problems that explains why r* may be higher than r**.
A corollary is that, generally speaking, the possibility (even certainty) of settlement is not an appropriaterationalefor capping contingent fees. So long as the fee is unitary - meaning the lawyer
collects the same percentage whether the case goes to trial or
settles - then the prospect of settlement does not generally lower
the optimal fee.

72. One interesting consequence is that ex ante, clients might be better off committing themselves not to agree to any settlement. They could then just pay the lawyer r*.
However, courts are hostile to the idea of enforcing waivers of the right to settle. See
Miller, supra note 3, at 210 n.65.
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APPENDIX

A.

Divergence of r** from r*

Here we derive the results in Part IV.A. The client wants to
choose r to maximize (1 - r) W, where W= pqw + (1 - p) w. Differentiating with respect to r gives
-r)

pw + -p (q-l)w +(pq+ l-p)
dr
dr
dr

W.

(A1)

Now, by assumption, r* maximizes (1 - r) w, which implies that at
r* (1 - r) (dw/dr) - w = 0; rearranging terms, we have dw/dr= wl
(1 - r). Accordingly, we can rewrite (Al) as

(1-r*) dr

(q* - 1) w*

+
dr

,

(A2)

dr

where p*, q* and w* are the values of p, q, and w evaluated at r*.
Expression (A2) has the same sign as
dq
-rp*

dp

+ -(q

dr

*

- 1).

(A3)

dr

Observe that if dq/dr and dp/dr are zero, then r** = r*. Otherwise r** may be greater or smaller than r*
B.

The Value of r** in Different Settlement Stories

In what follows we derive the optimal fees for the simulated
cases described in Part V.
1.

Trial-Only World7 3

The lawyer's trial production function is assumed to take
the form
w (x) = a (1 - e- OX
(A4)
73. See Hay, supra note 1, at 515-17 for a more detailed discussion of this
production. function and the optimal contingent fee it implies.
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where x is the lawyer's total pretrial investment in the case. If
the case goes to trial, the lawyer chooses x to maximize yw - x, the
first-order condition of the solution is rape - Ox- 1 = 0, which implies that x = ln(ra)/3; plugging this into (A4) gives w = a(1 1/nx13] ). The clientwants to choose rto maximize (1 - r)w. The
first-order condition of the solution is given by (1 - r)
[dw/dx] [dx/dr] = w. Inserting the appropriate values (derived
from the above expressions) into this equation and solving for r,
we have

r* = F-0

2.

(A5)

Settlement Bargaining

We derive the optimal fee for the setting described in Part
V.B. Since the parties have symmetric information, the expected
settlement amount is given by
s=

(w -0

x )+ (I_
r

(w +y)
(A6)

=

w-keX r + (1-X) y

Assume the parties have the same costs - that is, that y = x.
Given settlement, the client wants to maximize (1 - r) s. The firstorder condition is (1 - r) s'- s = 0. Proceeding as we did above for
the trial-only world, we find that the optimal fee is given by

I + (ln(rj) + r) ( + O- 1)

3.

(A7)

Asymmetric Information About the Evidence

Call a plaintiff with high-quality evidence a "high type," and
call his counterpart with low-quality evidence a "low type." Begin
by considering the high type's choice of fee. Faced with a plaintiff with some fee r, the most the defendant will offer to settle for
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is WH. Not knowing the plaintiffs type, the defendant will offer
either WL or WH, the later of which, by assumption, is the greater
figure. If he offers less than wH, the case will go to trial. Thus,
the high type's expected payoff is (1 - r)wH, which by definition is
maximized by rH*. Accordingly, the high type should definitely
choose rH*.
Now consider the defendant's choice of offer amounts. If
the defendant observes rL*, he knows he faces a low type, and
should offer WL*. But if he observes rH*, he does not know what
type he faces. Let zih. represent the expected judgment for a low
type who uses rH*. The defendant should offer either vh or wH*,
since the latter dominates all greater amounts, while the former
dominates all amounts less than WH*. A high type will accept
nothing less than WH*. Thus, if he offers less than that, the defendant may as well offer the minimum amount acceptable to
the low type, namely z .
Returning to the plaintiffs side, consider the low type's
choice of fee. If he uses anything other than rH*, he will immediately be recognized as a low type. And if the defendant knows he
faces a low type, he will offer WL. Thus, if he uses any fee r other
than rH*, the low-type's payoff will be (1 - r) WL, which is by definition maximized by rL*. It follows that the low type should choose
either rH* or rL*. Let j be the probability that the defendant offers WH* to settle the case. Then the low type will be indifferent
between the two offer amounts when
(1 - rH*)

[jwH*

+ (1 -j)Z]

-

(1 - rL*)WL*.

Denote byjthe value of j satisfying this equality. Then, rearranging terms, we have
(1 (1

rL*)WL* -

(1

-

rH*)WL

- rH*) WH* - (1 - rH*)

(bL

If j > j the low type will prefer rH*.
Turning back to the defendant, let g represent the conditional probability that a plaintiff using rH* is a high type. Upon
observing ru*, the defendant will be indifferent between the two
offer amounts if
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g(wH* + yn*) + (1 - g)Zi = U0,

where yH* represents the defendant's anticipated litigation costs
if the plaintiff is a high type and takes the case to trial. Denote
by k the value of g that satisfies this equality. Rearranging terms,
we find that
WH*W L
=b
WH

(A9)

WH* + yH* - ZiL

If g > , the defendant will prefer to offer wzH*.
We are now in a position to derive the optimal fee in equilibrium. We need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: p > k. Let p represent the unconditional distribution
of high types in the relevant population of claims (1 > h > 0). We
know, since all high types use rH*, that g _>p. Accordingly, if p >
, it follows that g > k. The defendant will then definitely offer
W*, meaning, since f < 1, that j > f Thus, the low type will, like
the high type, want to follow a pure strategy of using rH*.
Case 2: p < k. In case 2, the low type will not follow a pure
strategy in equilibrium. For if all plaintiffs used rH*, then it
would be true that g < k, so the defendant would offer zDL to everyone; but then the low type would be better off switching to rL*.
By definition, (1 - rL*) WL* > (1 - rH*) zbL. On the other hand, if all
low types used rL*, then the defendant would offer WH* to every
plaintiff who used rH*, but then the low type would be better off
switching to rH*. By assumption, (1 - rH*)WH* > (1 - rL*)WL*. No
pure strategy pursued by the low type can hold in equilibrium.
There is, however, a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the
plaintiff randomizes between the two fees. We know that the low
type is indifferent between the fee amounts when the defendant
offers wH* with probability f Now, let h represent the unconditional probability the low type uses fee rH*. By Bayes' rule,
g=

Ii

9(A10)
g + h(1 - R)

Let h represent the value of h that establishes this equality when
we plug in the value k. Rearranging terms, we have
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jg(1-, )

(All)

Suppose the low type uses rH* with probability h. Then, substituting terms into (A10), we have
Ii

t+

(1-

-0-

(A12)

g)/

From this it follows that there is an equilibrium point at which
the low type uses rH* with probability h, while the defendant offers wH* with probability f
4.

Asymmetric Information about the Fee

We now derive the equilibrium for the game described in
Part V.C.2 of the text. Let 1 denote the probability the plaintiff
employs the low fee (f). Let m be the probability the defendant
makes the low offer (w). The plaintiff is indifferent between the
two fees when
(1 - f) [mz + (1 - m)w*] = (1- r*)w*

Let 7h denote the value of m for which this is an equality. Rearranging terms gives

(

r*f

)

w*

(A13)

As for the defendant, he is indifferent between the two offer
amounts when
w* = lrb + (I - l) (w*+ y*).

Let i denote the value of I for which this inequality is satisfied.
Rearranging terms gives
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S= (w*- Y*
ID)+ y*

[Vol. 23

(A1M)

If the plaintiff uses the low fee with probability land the defendant makes the low offer with probability rh, neither has an incentive to defect from equilibrium.
5. Investment in Settlement
Assume the settlement production function has the following structure:
s = yw (1

-

e4 ' )

where z is the lawyer's pre-negotiation investment, and y and 8
are exogenous parameters. We will assume that the pre-negotiation investment has no effect on the expected judgment at trial;
thus w is independent of z.
This assumption may often be realistic. Suppose that 8> [3,
which essentially means it is easier to bring the parties "up to
speed" in the case than it is to bring the court up to speed. If
this inequality holds, and if y is not too great (though it may be
more than one), the lawyer, given a particular fee, will invest less
in the pre-settlement negotiation than she would in the trial-only
world. As a result, the value of the expected judgment is unaffected by the lawyer's pre-negotiation investment. The interpretation here is that whatever trial preparation occurs before
negotiation could, and would, just as easily have been put off
until the post-negotiation phase. The lawyer can therefore treat
w as exogenous to her choice of pre-negotiation investment
level.
Finding the optimal fee then involves the same procedure
that we followed in the trial-only setting. Indeed, we can simply
transfer the results of the trial-only setting to the present concern by substituting yw for a, 8 for [3, and xl for x. Doing so
yields the following equilibrium value for the settlement as a
function of the fee:
1 (= I-)
s=]'w 1
rY'w8
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Plugging in w = a(1 - [1/ra3]) and rearranging terms yields
S=(X'( I-

+ '8

(A16)

The client then wants to choose r to maximize (1 - r)s. Solving
his problem as we did for the trial-only world generates the optimal fee
1

S1
r=
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